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The Political Economy of ‘Tax Spillover’: A New
Multilateral Framework
Andrew Baker
University of Sheffield
Richard Murphy
City, University of London
Abstract
Tax spillovers are the effects one country’s tax rules and practices have on other countries. They have been assessed in aggre-
gate terms by the IMF using econometric models, and were found to have a ‘signiﬁcant and sizable’ impact in reducing corpo-
rate tax bases and rates in ‘developing countries. However, a widely accepted form of country level spillover analysis remains
elusive, despite demands from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations (IOs). We present the
ﬁrst framework for conducting comprehensive national level spillover analyses using a qualitative evaluation framework in
three steps. First we identify the importance of the normative underpinnings of multilateral evaluation frameworks. We make
the case for an international moral harm convention that discourages states from doing harm to other states through their
tax policies. Second we illustrate some of the difﬁculties in conducting country level spillover analyses using econometric
methods, while advancing a broader conception of spillover, based on the defensive purpose of corporation tax. Third we pre-
sent a new framework for conducting spillover analysis, that assesses relationships between four direct taxes and a number of
administrative and institutional features of tax systems. Finally, we present initial pilot qualitative assessments for the UK and
Denmark, involving scores, risk dashboards and visualisations.
Policy Implications
• Systematic country by country tax spillover analysis should be undertaken in a multilateral process overseen by existing
international organisations, with the IMF, the OECD, the UN and the World Bank all feeding into the precise design of the
exercise.
• Such an exercise should not be exclusively quantitative, but should involve a substantial qualitative process, involving
reporting and assessing of a wide range of tax practices and processes.
• Such an exercise should be informed by the aim of reducing the harm states do to their own ﬁscal autonomy and that of
other states as a practical element of an effective international moral harm convention on taxation.
• Spillover assessments should be driven by an understanding that the purpose of corporation and capital gains taxes is to
defend and buttress tax systems as a whole.
• To be comprehensive spillover assessment should consider spillovers between and within tax systems covering the follow-
ing areas: income tax; corporation tax; capital gains tax; social security; tax politics; tax administration; company and trust
administration; and international agreements.
• Spillover assessment is therefore domestic as well as international and should revolve around three forms of assessment:
domestic spillovers; international risks generated by a jurisdiction; international vulnerabilities of a jurisdiction.
• Professional assessors conducting spillover analysis should collect impressions about current tax practice through wide
ranging stakeholder consultations, including interviews and surveys, in a process similar to the corporate governance
ROSCs conducted by World Bank Staff. These ﬁeld notes should translate into a more qualitative style country reports assess-
ing and reporting on tax practices and the spillover risks in the jurisdiction, and should contain targeted policy recommenda-
tions.
The Context and Case for Tax Spillover
In a world characterised by complex, multifaceted cross-border
socioeconomic phenomenon, conventional measurement sys-
tems are under strain (Christophers, 2013; M€ugge, 2016). Many
traditional numerical indicators and methods of calculation
struggle to provide accurate gauges of complex global
economic chains. ‘Dodgy’ contestable data repeatedly blight
international measurement and evaluation processes (Broome
and Quirk, 2015b, p. 829). This raises the question of how gov-
ernments, international organisations, civil society and even
social scientists can and should respond.
One way in which processes of global governance can deal
with such complexity is to make greater use of qualitative
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assessments and evaluations as a means of providing more
rounded readings of the complex phenomenon of a globalis-
ing world. ‘Tax spillover’ is an emerging policy ﬁeld, where
there is a case for the adoption of a qualitative multilateral
spillover evaluation framework.1 We propose and present a
new multilateral framework, the ﬁrst for conducting national
level tax spillover analyses, with the aim of providing
systematic recurrent audits of the spillover risks and vulnera-
bilities posed and faced by particular tax jurisdictions. We
suggest there are two particular advantages to such a
qualitative framework. First, it captures many of the things
missed by more quantitative approaches reliant on ofﬁcial
data and established data sets. Second, it is guided by the
objective of identifying, evaluating and discouraging forms
of tax competition that potentially harm other states, as part
of a new international moral harm convention, rather than
simply being an exercise in measurement for measurement’s
sake.
Concern that a ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate taxation
is eroding national tax bases, motivated G20 governments
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) to adopt the Base Erosion and Proﬁt Shift-
ing (BEPS) Action Plan in 2013 (OECD, 2013). Development
NGOs, advocacy groups and some economists worry that
tax competition between states is harming developing
countries (Abbas and Klemm, 2013, Eurodad, 2017, Henry,
2018, Oxfam, 2016; Sachs, 2011; TJN, 2006). Tax competition
involves countries, states and cities offering tax cuts, breaks,
loopholes or subsidies to encourage the relocation of sub-
stantive economic activity to their domain, or simply by
attracting ofﬁce functions for the purpose of booking proﬁts.
In a race to the bottom scenario, states compete with one
another to attract global capital ﬂows and investment
through such measures.
Fears about the harmful effects of tax competition were
given added credence in 2014, when the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) published a paper on ‘tax spillovers’.
Tax spillovers were deﬁned as the effects of one country’s
tax rules and practices on others (IMF, 2014). The paper con-
cluded that tax ‘spillovers’ have a ‘signiﬁcant and sizable’
impact in reducing corporate tax bases and rates in ‘devel-
oping countries’, with the impact two or three times higher
than in OECD countries (IMF, 2014.) Spillover effects were
also found to go well beyond tax revenues, to include
macroeconomic performance and the broader level and dis-
tribution of welfare across nations (IMF, 2014). In this
respect, tax spillovers can be conceived of as a potential
threat to national sovereignty, eroding tax bases and imped-
ing ‘ﬁscal self-determination’, or the ability to achieve policy
goals through legislative programmes (Dietsch, 2015; Van
Apeldoorn, 2018).
Since the IMF paper, many development NGOs and even
some parliamentarians have begun calling for systematic
country level reporting and assessment of tax spillover
costs and risks (Action Aid, 2018, Oxfam, 2015, Christian
Aid, 2017a, 2017b, Cobham and Gibson, 2016; APPG
Responsible Tax, 20162). At the same time, international
organisations intend to discuss with a range of
stakeholders, including NGOs, the viability of conducting a
form of tax spillover analysis, mainly through the platform
for collaboration on tax (PCT) – a recurring stakeholder dia-
logue on tax and sustainable development, launched in
April 2016 by the IMF, OECD, the United Nations (UN) and
the World Bank Group (WBG). The PCT’s ﬁrst conference in
2018 established a broad aspiration to ‘analyze and report
on the spillovers and opportunities from changes in the
international tax environment on and for developing coun-
tries’ (PCT, 2018).
Unfortunately, tools for conducting effective tax spillover
analysis remain underdeveloped and no settled formula, or
method, is agreed upon. Rather methodological problems
in quantifying country level spillovers are freely acknowl-
edged (IMF, 2014). At the same time, the IMF’s current
conception of tax spillovers is a narrow one, centred
around a distinction between base (reductions in inward
investment) and strategic spillovers (further reductions in
corporation tax as a policy response) and potentially
misses many spillover risks and vulnerabilities. In this
paper, we broaden the deﬁnition of spillover, highlighting
corporation tax’s defensive social purpose, in protecting
and reinforcing other parts of the tax base, acting as a
form of societal adhesive that holds tax systems and soci-
eties together, rather than as merely a revenue raising
device. We use this conception and understanding of cor-
porate taxation to generate a new evaluation framework,
covering a wide range of spillovers, including within state
spillovers between four direct domestic taxes. Our frame-
work has three primary objectives: to comprehensively
evaluate and audit future spillover risks and vulnerabilities
on a country-by-country basis; to attach reputational disin-
centives to the pursuit of aggressive ‘harmful’ tax competi-
tion; and to inform and catalyse future policy dialogue
about targeted policy reform. The framework would be
most suitably deployed by teams of trained professional
evaluators with experience in the tax policy ﬁeld, under
the umbrella of an international organisation. Similarly, the
framework is a tool kit that could be used by specialist
expert NGOs to generate their own analyses and gradings
of spillover risks.
In the ﬁrst section of the paper, we draw on the insight
that it is common for current international benchmarks to
have normative underpinnings (Broome and Quirk, 2015a,
2015b; Broome et al., 2018). Accordingly, our framework is
minimally normative. It starts from a position that an inter-
national moral harm convention (Linklater, 2011) discourag-
ing tax competition harming other states, by attaching
reputational costs to such behaviour (Sharman, 2007), is
desirable. In prioritising such an objective, we have directly
responded to approaches from and discussions with key
stakeholders – Oxfam, Action Aid, Christian Aid, the Tax Jus-
tice Network (TJN), the UK’s All Party Parliamentary Group
on Inclusive Growth and the Global Initiative for Fiscal Trans-
parency (GIFT – involving the IMF and the World Bank). In
the second section of the paper, we consider the method-
ological difﬁculties of quantifying country level spillovers,
including the shortcomings of existing country level
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spillover analyses. We establish the merits of a more qualita-
tive form of spillover evaluation that draws on a broader
deﬁnition and understanding of tax spillover. In the third
and ﬁnal section of the paper, we outline how our qualita-
tive evaluation framework works, the methods it uses and
present initial pilot assessments for the UK and Denmark,
including risk dashboards.
Norms, reputation and international
benchmarking
Tax has become an increasingly prominent and contested
area of multilateral governance over the last decade (Cob-
ham et al., 2015; Dietsch and Rixen, 2017; Eccleston and
Gray, 2014; Palan and Wigan, 2014; Rixen, 2008, 2011a,b;
Seabrooke and Wigan, 2016; Sharman, 2006). This has been
a direct response to the globalisation of ﬁnancial and corpo-
rate networks and practices, meaning that national tax poli-
cies now have implications well beyond single jurisdictions,
as does corporate activity such as transfer-pricing – the rules
and methods through which economic transactions are
priced and accounted for within a transnational enterprise
under common ownership (Bryan et al., 2017, Palan, Murphy
and Chavagneux, 2010; Picciotto, 1992; Zucman, 2014). Since
the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, rising public debt and public anger
sparked by high proﬁle leaks such as the Panama and Par-
adise Papers, as well as news of the limited amount of tax
paid by global companies such as Google, Amazon and Star-
bucks have meant questions of tax justice have gained polit-
ical prominence.
To date, the international response to these develop-
ments has focused on initiatives such as automatic informa-
tion exchange (AIE) and country-by-country reporting (CbCR)
under the BEPS plan. These initiatives potentially increase
available information about the activities of large compa-
nies. However, as the IMF’s work on tax spillovers demon-
strated (IMF, 2014), focusing on corporate activity is only
one side of the equation in moving towards a more just
and effective international tax system. Just as important are
the tax policies and administrative practices relating to the
setting and collection of taxes by governments. As others
have noted the BEPS initiative falls short of protecting states
from threats to their ﬁscal self-determination that may result
from tax competition (Devereux and Vella, 2014; Van Apel-
doorn, 2018). For example in 2013, UK Prime Minister, David
Cameron hosted the G8 summit, heralding a new OECD
focus on AIE and CbCR as the start of a tough new interna-
tional regime on tax avoidance and evasion. At the same
time, he also lauded UK plans to cut corporation tax to 17%,
as the lowest in the G20, and other potential beggar thy
neighbour policies, including the so called patent box tax
break, ostensibly targeted at research and development
ﬁrms. In this respect, tax competition policies pursued by
governments can potentially threaten other states’ capacity
for ﬁscal self-determination, by eroding their pool of
resources for redistributive purposes. Protection of ﬁscal
self-determination, therefore requires going beyond BEPS, to
at least include some regulation of the tax rates set by
states (Van Apeldoorn, 2018), or as we suggest, identifying
and disincentivising policies that pose pronounced spillover
threats to other countries’ tax bases, as the practical ele-
ment of a new international moral harm convention.
The framework we advance is a response to a context in
which NGO and public sentiment, as well as the intellectual
climate in IOs such as the IMF, is more sympathetic to the
goal of reducing the negative impact tax competition poli-
cies pursued by one state, can have on others.3 This context
is also the reason why we make both identifying and dis-
couraging potential harmful tax competition the baseline
norm of the framework. As Martin Brehm Christensen, pri-
mary author of a recent Action Aid report on spillovers
noted, ‘if we agree on a general set of international tax prin-
ciples: First principle should be, do no harm to other states’
(Action Aid, 2018, Europa Capacity4Dev, 2017). Currently, the
notion that tax practices can be harmful is very much pre-
sent in spillover debates, and goes beyond the concerns of
NGOs and developing country governments, to include the
work of the European Commission and the IMF (European
Commission, 2012; IMF 2014).4 International relations schol-
ars have made a case for developing stronger international
moral harm conventions, to prevent avoidable harm
whether intentional, or unintentional, as part of a world
ethic (Linklater 2002, 2011). However, little detailed work to
date has considered how such conventions might practically
be extended to the economic domain.
Our framework is essentially a form of multilateral surveil-
lance or peer review. These exercises function through a
mix of formal recommendations and informal dialogue; pub-
lic scrutiny, comparisons and even rankings of countries; fol-
lowed by public reactions to the publication of results by
electorates, interest groups, public ofﬁcials and politicians
(Pagani, 2002; Broome and Quirk, 2015a; Sch€afer, 2006) Such
review and grading processes create the basis for ‘symbolic
judgements’ on countries relative performances that func-
tion through shaming processes and unfavourable compar-
isons with peers (Broome and Quirk, 2015b). These symbolic
judgements can in turn unleash a ‘politics of bad perfor-
mance’, sparking a review of existing practices, while provid-
ing ammunition for critics of the status quo. A politics of
bad performance can also create incentives for actors to
change behaviours in anticipation of a negative score and
associated social reputational costs (Broome and Quirk,
2015b; Sharman, 2007).
The framework we present in the ﬁnal section of the
paper seeks to stimulate such a ‘politics of bad performance’
by attaching recurrent reputational risk to tax competition
that can be shown to be harmful to other states. This is
hardly a departure from how many existing international
benchmarks function. Normative criteria are often projected
into many existing evaluation exercises by specifying appro-
priate conducts, behaviours and good practices (Broome
and Quirk, 2015b). Measurement systems and forms of eval-
uation are difﬁcult to meaningfully separate from their
underpinning political values and preferences, frequently
resulting in forms of ‘norm evaluation’ (Broome et al., 2018;
M€ugge, 2016). Consequently, choice of norm is usually prior
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in the construction of international benchmarks and multi-
lateral evaluation frameworks.
NGOs and expert activists have used benchmarks to both
gradually change (reformist) and to directly challenge the
existing normative order (revolutionary) (Seabrooke and
Wigan, 2015). We view our framework as a hybrid combin-
ing a mixture of the revolutionary and reformist logics iden-
tiﬁed by Seabrooke and Wigan. For example, the choice of
norm to underpin our framework, is neither clearly reformist
nor revolutionary. Average headline corporation tax rates in
OECD countries have been cut from 32% in 2000 to 25% in
2015 (Ting, 2016). The average worldwide headline rate has
fallen from 27.45% to 20.73% between 2006 and 2016,
including 65 states cutting their headline rate during that
period.5 Our framework seeks to abate this trend by disin-
centivising tax competition that spills over to harm other
countries. Potentially this gives a revolutionary ﬂavour to the
framework, by presenting a challenge to the current orienta-
tion of the system and to the contributions of particular
units, especially leading Anglo-sphere powers who have
often led the way in tax competition (Swank, 2016; Rixen,
2011a, 2011b). At the same time, however, the framework
represents a more gradual intermediate step than more rev-
olutionary proposals, such as the creation of an international
tax authority (Dietsch and Rixen, 2017), unitary taxation (a
tax on a corporation’s global income followed by apportion-
ment to states following a speciﬁed formula) (Picciotto,
2016), or minimum corporation tax rates (Murphy, 2016). It
is also a direct response to the concerns of established IOs
and NGOs.6 Spillover analysis already has issue salience with
these actors and our proposal ﬂows in the same direction as
many of their existing positions, illustrating the framework’s
reformist characteristics (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2015). How-
ever, as the next section illustrates, the framework is also
based on methodological critique of existing spillover analy-
ses, usually associated with more revolutionary approaches
(Seabrooke and Wigan, 2015.) Such a hybrid approach broad-
ens the potential political appeal of the framework, while also
enabling us to present new methodological departures
Tax spillover as an emerging policy field
Tax spillover was established as a real world phenomenon
in an extensive 86-page report produced by the Fiscal
Affairs Department of the IMF in 2014 (IMF, 2014). The
report claimed that the strength and pervasiveness of tax
spillovers were such, that it created a strong case for a more
inclusive and less piecemeal approach to international tax
co-operation (IMF, 2014, p. 1). Methodologically, the Fund
paper was based around two equations that estimated two
types of spillover – base spillover (reductions in inward
investment) and strategic spillover (reductions in corporation
tax rates as a policy response to cuts elsewhere.) Both equa-
tions were applied to unbalanced panel data for 173 coun-
ties over the period 1980–2013 (IMF, 2014, pp. 52-53).
The headline ﬁnding was that a one-point reduction in
corporation tax in all countries would reduce a typical coun-
try’s corporate tax base by 3.7%, implying a sizable effect,
given average corporate tax rates had fallen by 5% over the
previous decade (IMF, 2014, p. 19). A typical country was
shown in the data to respond to a 1% cut by other coun-
tries with a 0.5% cut, reducing the average long-term corpo-
rate tax base by 2.5%. Using approximations of gross
operating surpluses (GOS), actual corporate tax revenues
were also compared to calculations of revenue accruing
from the GOS method. Revenue loss in the relatively small
sample of countries considered was 5% (excluding conduit
countries), but 13% in non-OECD countries (IMF, 2014, p. 20).
Harmful spillovers were therefore demonstrated to be
empirically robust and found to be most pronounced in
developing countries.
The paper also contained methodological health warn-
ings, cautioning that estimations of aggregate revenue
effects remained elusive (IMF, 2014, p. 15), and that country
level estimates were highly problematic. In particular, the
existence of conduit countries as intermediate destinations
in the routing of investments for proﬁt shifting purposes,
made country level spillover estimates potentially highly
misleading (IMF, 2014, p. 21). Intra-ﬁrm transactions (ac-
counting for 42% of goods trade in the US) and the rise of
intangible assets – intellectual property, patents, – which are
easily relocated, also complicate identifying which countries
are the source of corporate income (IMF, 2014, p. 10). Many
jurisdictions are also attractive for tax purposes not because
their statutory rate is especially low, but because of special
regimes not captured in headline data (IMF, 2014, p. 19).
Patchy data on allowances, especially in developing coun-
tries, also means that average effective rates of corporate
tax are often much lower than statutory rates (IMF, 2014
p. 52). If we are to obtain a better sense of the spillover risks
associated with these practices and processes, qualitative
reporting and assessment would be a useful ﬁrst step.
One result of the IMF’s methodological and data health
warnings, is that the international community is no closer to
having a framework for conducting country level spillover
evaluations. IMF staff have noted that spillovers warrant fur-
ther consideration in Article IV discussions and have urged
G20 countries to consider spillover effects on developing
countries, before embarking on any tax reforms (IMF, 2014,
p. 24; IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank, 2010). However, IMF
staff have shown little ambition, or intent to conduct their
own country level spillover analyses, given their method-
ological concerns. Identifying who generates what level of
spillovers quantitatively, remains problematic on a country-
by-country basis. Current IMF econometric estimations are
also better suited to measuring spillovers that have already
occurred across a range of countries, rather than providing
more forward-looking assessments of the source of potential
future risks, or in pin pointing policy reform priorities. Our
qualitative reporting and assessment framework seeks to
identify potential threats to a country’s tax base, both from
their own policies and practices, but also those pursued in
other countries, as well as the potential level of risk a
regime poses for other countries.
The difﬁculties of conducting quantitative country level
spillover analysis, crystallized further, when the Netherlands
© 2019 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2019)
Andrew Baker and Richard Murphy
4
and Republic of Ireland governments undertook spillover
analyses in 2015 (IBFD, 2015; Kosters, 2015). The Dutch analy-
sis took a narrow form, using secondary econometric
research to put numbers on foregone dividend and interest
withholding tax revenues in developing countries, as a con-
sequence of Dutch tax treaties, at a range €150–550 million
per year (IOB, 2013, p. 14). The Irish study asserted that low
levels of direct trade and investment between Ireland and
developing countries, meant the Irish corporation tax regime
could only have a minimal impact on developing countries
(IBFD, 2015), but made the report even less use of country
level data than the Dutch study (Weyzig, 2015).7 It is ironic of
course, that given the IMF study highlighted proﬁt shifting as
a major cause of spillover, the two states most heavily impli-
cated in Europe’s most notorious proﬁt shifting scheme, the
‘double Irish with a Dutch sandwich’, are the two countries
to have undertaken their own spillover analyses. While the
latter scheme was shut down in 2014, the ‘single malt’
involving Malta, with whom Ireland has a bilateral tax treaty,
has since become operational (Christian Aid, 2017b). How-
ever, the Irish report claimed it no longer facilitated conduit
structures that caused revenue loss for developing countries
(IBFD, 2015, p. 8) Again qualitative reporting of proﬁt shifting
processes, the ﬂows they entail and the factors facilitating
them may be a useful ﬁrst step in giving a fuller reading of
spillover risk and in identifying potential policy reforms.
The kinds of country self-assessments, undertaken by
Netherlands and Ireland are also problematic for other reasons.
As in the Dutch and Irish cases, an idiosyncratic focus and
uneven variable methods mean that such analyses will often
not be comparable. Self-assessments can also be manipulated
for political reasons and placed at the service of the pre-con-
ceived goal of a clean bill of health. For these reasons we favour
vesting responsibility for conducting spillover analysis with a
multilateral agency, using a common assessment framework.
The framework we propose is a direct response to the
data limitations noted above and to the IMF observation
that we lack a thorough understanding of what forms of tax
competition are particularly harmful for others. Aggressive
competition for very mobile parts of the tax base, may for
example be preferable to intense competition over a wider
base (IMF, 2014, p. 43). Reaching such judgements requires
a better sense of the threats and vulnerabilities that arise
from the conﬁguration of the wider tax base of a jurisdic-
tion, including its policies and administrative practices.
The wider tax base of a jurisdiction also becomes impor-
tant when we consider the function corporate taxes perform.
Corporation and capital gains taxes do more than merely
raise revenue. They also have a defensive social purpose,
reinforcing other direct taxes such as income tax, or social
security, maintaining the integrity and functioning of tax sys-
tems as a whole. Without them, it becomes easier for individ-
uals to present income as a capital gains, or to transfer it to
a company structure, leaving it untaxed. In the UK, Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan’s speech to parliament
introducing a separate corporation tax in 1965, contained a
recognition of this. He noted the new tax would ‘not pro-
duce double taxation of company proﬁts, because only a
small percentage of proﬁts were distributed to shareholders
as dividends’, meaning ‘company proﬁts and personal
income were not the same thing and should be treated dif-
ferently’ (Hansard, 1965, Vol. 710). In this reading, corpora-
tion tax makes it more difﬁcult to park untaxed capital in
company structures. In the United States, congressional
debate around the introduction of corporation tax in 1894,
emphasised reaching shareholders who might otherwise
escape paying tax on their income (Bank, 2001). The US legal
literature refers to this as the ‘aggregate defence’ of corpora-
tion tax (Avi-Yonah, 2004) Our conception, is subtly different
to this legal interpretation, because it places less emphasis
on reaching individual shareholders through indirect taxa-
tion, and more emphasis on the buttressing function of cor-
poration and capital gains taxes, limiting potential leakages
in tax systems.8 Such a conception, also has implications for
how we conceive of tax spillovers. In particular, the relation-
ship corporate taxes have to other direct taxes, becomes all
important. Any balanced spillover assessment consequently
needs to ask whether a particular aspect of a tax system rein-
forces, or undermines both other aspects of the same sys-
tem, and aspects of other countries’ tax systems. Spillovers
can therefore take both domestic and international forms
and can occur between different taxes. Our framework is
informed by three observations: tax spillovers occur both
within and between jurisdictions; tax spillovers exist between
different taxes; tax spillovers can be created by administra-
tive disorder and regulatory arrangements.
Our qualitative evaluation framework consequently seeks
to assesses the relationship between four direct taxes within
and between tax jurisdictions to a get broader sense of the
risks and vulnerabilities particular regimes generate and face
in their entirety. These are personal income tax (PIT); corpo-
rate income tax (CIT); capital gains tax (CGT); and social
security contributions (national insurance) (SCR). Value
added tax (VAT) and excise duties are both indirect taxes
and not the subject of overt tax competition, so are not
considered here. We also assess four endogenous features
of tax systems: tax politics; tax administration; company and
trust administration; and international agreements.
The IMF established the spillover concept, but its experi-
ence of conducting qualitative forms of assessment is lim-
ited. One fruitful potential example for future spillover
analysis, is provided by OECD and World Bank collaboration
on assessments of good corporate governance principles.
Authoring corporate governance Reports on the Observation
of Standard’s Codes (ROSCs), a World Bank team adopted
both a diagnostic and developmental rationale. This
involved identifying policy weaknesses and tailored remedial
policy recommendations through a triangulated pluralistic
multi-stakeholder dialogue in an iterative process. These
were published in a discursive report on current governance
practices that collated a series of ‘impressions’ garnered
from the administration of questionnaires, interviews with
stakeholders (regulators, CEOs, corporate lawyers, accoun-
tants and labour groups) and through a systematic examina-
tion of legal documents and their application (Baker, 2012).
This mode of qualitative evaluation and information
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collection, based on widespread stakeholder consultation
can act as a model for a more comprehensive and system-
atic form of qualitative tax spillover analysis that we set out
in more detail in the next section (also see Action Aid,
2018).
A qualitative spillover evaluation framework
The qualitative evaluation framework we present is a toolkit
for conducting spillover assessments and requires assessors
to ﬁll out three grids: (1) domestic; (2) international risks
generated; (3) vulnerability to international risks. Assessors
do this by answering a series of questions about how tax
policies and practices in the jurisdiction concerned have
implications for other areas. To help in this exercise we have
created an extensive online appendix questionnaire for each
grid, which indicates the areas and issues that should be
considered in informing the allocation of scores on a 1–5
scale (Data S1). In reaching judgements, professional asses-
sors can cross-reference a range of information sources –
interviews with stakeholders, the administration of question-
naires, analysis of legal documentation and legislation, to
create a picture of behaviours and processes. Written notes
talking back to the questionnaire can detail the information
used to answer questions and inform scores, creating the
basis for a longer discursive qualitative report within a com-
mon structured framework, that sets out spillover risks and
vulnerabilities in each jurisdiction (Data S2).
All three assessment grids are necessary and essential to
give a full and comprehensive reading of spillovers. We rec-
ommend starting with the domestic grid to acquaint asses-
sors with the particular jurisdiction. The three grids are also
designed to increase the political traction of the framework
with different constituencies. To date in our discussions with
stakeholders, we have found that the domestic grid is of
most interest to domestic opposition groups and think tanks
interested in producing a more progressive set of domestic
tax policies, as well as revenue collection agencies that
could use ﬁndings to call for more resources. The interna-
tional risk grid appeals most to development NGOs and the
staff of some IOs, concerned that spillovers are impeding
economic performance in developing countries. The interna-
tional vulnerabilities grid is of most interest to developing
country governments seeking to understand how targeted
reform of domestic tax policy can best protect their tax base
from international threats, as well as IOs and NGOs specialis-
ing in dispensing technical policy advice.
One of the biggest potential political obstacles to our pro-
posed evaluation framework is that insufﬁcient numbers of
established major powers agree to enter into a spillover
evaluation and oppose the framework. This is a particular
risk with countries that have pursued aggressive tax compe-
tition and could be identiﬁed as spillover risk generators, or
bad performers. In Europe, countries such as France and
Germany may recognise the merits of subjecting the policies
of states like Ireland, Luxembourg and a post Brexit, United
Kingdom to greater scrutiny. However, such concerns are
also why it is essential that the spillover framework
addresses government concerns about how they might bet-
ter address their own vulnerabilities. Some countries will
also perform well on the international risks grid and be
good performers, generating few harms for others. Once a
number of signiﬁcant states have entered into the evalua-
tion exercise, pressure for others to follow suit will increase.
Major European countries are the obvious place to start,
given levels of political appetite and demand for resisting
tax competition and for country level spillover assessments
(European Commission, 2012; Action Aid, 2018, Europa
Capacity4Dev, 2017).
Assessors complete three appraisal grids that each resem-
ble Figure 1, and for each square on the grid the assessor
awards a grade on a 1–5 scale. For the domestic grid, they
begin in the top left corner, working across horizontally to
consider how the tax or policy area listed in the rows, start-
ing with income tax (top of y axis), is impacted upon by the
areas listed in the columns (x axis). For example, for the sec-
ond box on the ﬁrst row, the assessor asks ‘is this country’s
income tax base undermined by its corporation tax system?’
If they think it does then the score is either 5 or 4, depend-
ing upon the severity of that threat. Alternatively, if they
think that corporation tax reinforces the income tax base,
then the appropriate score is 1 or 2. Where there is no
impact either way the score is 3. A domestic spillover
assessment provides a reading of the degree to which a tax
system is balanced, asking whether different elements sup-
port, or undermine each other.
For the international risk grid, the assessor evaluates the
potential risks the issue being considered – (rows on the y
axis), generate for the various taxes and policy areas of
other countries listed in the columns (on the x axis). This
reverses the pattern of asking how the policy area (rows on
the y axis) under consideration is affected by areas in the
columns, as in the case of the domestic and international
vulnerabilities grids. The rows effectively act as the depen-
dent variable in domestic and international vulnerability
grids, but become the independent variable on the interna-
tional risk grid. These different forms of assessment are nec-
essary because states can be both aggressors and
generators of risk, but also vulnerable to spillover risk, to
varying degrees. The framework provides a comprehensive
reading of the diverse elements of spillover as a multi-
faceted and multidirectional phenomenon.
The following ﬁve-point scale is used for both the domes-
tic spillover and international vulnerability grid, with a score
of 5 indicating the highest risk/vulnerability and threat of a
harmful spillover effect. Risk and threat levels are colour
coded accordingly.
5 : The tax base or policy area being considered is heavily
undermined by and vulnerable to the area it is being com-
pared with.
4 . The tax base or policy area being considered is to
some extent undermined by and vulnerable to the area it is
being compared with
3. The tax base or policy area being considered is neither
undermined nor reinforced by the area it is being compared
with and has limited vulnerability
© 2019 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2019)
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2. The tax base or policy area being considered is to
some extent reinforced by the area it is being compared
and has little vulnerability
1 . The tax base or policy area being considered is signiﬁ-
cantly reinforced by the area it is being compared with and
is secure.
For international risks generated the following scoring sys-
tem is used.
5 : The area being considered undermines this element of
the tax system in other countries to a considerable extent.
4 . Some features of the area being considered undermine
elements of this aspect of the tax system of other countries
to some extent.
3 . Some features of the area being considered can have
detrimental effects on this area of the tax system in other
countries, but this is limited.
2 . The area being considered has limited impact on this
element of the tax system in other countries, with few signs
of harm.
1 . The area being considered poses no threats or risks to
this element of the tax system in other countries.
For all of the grids, higher scores are generally indicative
of poor performance, – either high degree of vulnerability
to harmful spillover risk, or the aggressive generation of spil-
lover risks for others.
Space prevents a thorough treatment of how the ques-
tionnaire can be used to guide assessors in reaching their
judgements, but for a domestic assessment of income tax,
the judgement needs to consider: the rate of progressivity
by percentage bands; by income band; whether the tax
base is comprehensive; whether incentives, allowances and
reliefs encourage tax planning; whether residency require-
ments produce exploitable loopholes? These questions
essentially enable income tax to be marked against itself in
the domestic grid. When assessing how corporation tax
impacts income tax, the following questions are suggested:
are there signiﬁcant differences in income and corporation
tax rates that may encourage ﬂows from one to the other;
does corporation tax encourage roll up of income at lower
rates than income tax; does the corporation tax regime
entail additional incentives, allowances and reliefs compared
to the income tax system; how do penalties for non-compli-
ance affect incentives to relocate income from the income
tax base to the corporation tax base? In effect what is being
appraised in the domestic grid in this box, is how the set-
ting and practices of corporation tax may cause leakages in
income tax, even unintentional ones.
Taking the case of corporation tax in the international risk
grid the assessment begins by asking about perceptions of
the overall rate; whether the base is comprehensive; is favour
provided to income arising outside of the jurisdiction; are
non-resident companies permitted – where a company is
incorporated in the jurisdiction but is effectively tax resident
elsewhere and exempted from local taxation; are there special
rates for dividends, royalties and overseas ﬁnancial ﬂows; are
there effective transfer-pricing rules; are there advance pric-
ing agreements, tax holidays, special tax rates and other
arrangements available to induce foreign direct investment
into the jurisdiction? Once these general orientation ques-
tions have been addressed, the more speciﬁc risks corpora-
tion tax arrangements pose to the corporation tax base in
other jurisdictions can be assessed: whether the jurisdiction
has a robust deﬁnition of the corporate tax base that limits
prospects for base arbitrage; whether the jurisdiction actively
participates in automatic information exchange on corpora-
tion tax; whether a country collects information to assist other
countries in collecting corporation tax owing to them, or
whether sources of income accruing from other jurisdictions,
are ignored and so on. These questions interrogate whether
both rates and practices in a particular area of taxation
Figure 1. Standard spillover assessment grid.
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threaten to undermine aspects of the tax base of other coun-
tries. We highlight them here for the indicative purpose of
showing how an assessor can use the questionnaire to work
systematically through grids awarding scores and building a
picture of spillover risks and vulnerabilities, their sources and
consequences from multiple directions, in a structured fash-
ion.
Tax politics in the grid refers to the general climate of
local political debate and is admittedly more difﬁcult to
assess, but such questions are crucial for the complexion of
a tax regime, and cannot be ignored altogether, even if they
do require careful handling. For example, is there evidence
of political opposition to wealth taxes, such as capital gains
tax? Is there an aversion to corporate transparency that
might undermine the base for corporation tax? Is there a
strong universal belief among political parties that rates
have to be set to induce activity and is there a consensus
and political pressure for further reductions? With regard to
tax administration, the appraiser has to consider whether
sufﬁcient resources are provided for a domestic tax author-
ity in all areas of its work to ensure there is a level playing
ﬁeld for the administration of all taxes and taxpayers, so
that it is likely that all tax due is paid, and equally no more
is collected than should be. In this respect, several existing
information sources on tax administration already exist that
might be fed into and used to inform the allocation of
scores and assessments in this area of review, including, the
Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT)
used by the IMF, the International Survey on Revenue
Administration (ISORA) through the OECD’s Forum on Tax
Administration (FTA) and the Integrated Assessment Model
for Tax Administration used by the World Bank (IAMTAX).
Notably the information collected in these exercises is only
one source of information that can be fed into this one ele-
ment of our spillover assessment framework. The question
of corporate and trust administration regimes examines
whether the arrangements for administering these entities
delivers sufﬁcient timely, quality data on their activities that
multiple tax administrations can access. International agree-
ments cover how tax treaties are interpreted and imple-
mented and how jurisdictions participate in CbCR and AIE.
Our concept of spillover recognises the interconnectivity
between these areas and that the identiﬁcation of laws, or
formal headline taxation rates alone are an insufﬁcient basis
on which to appraise spillover effects. What really matters
are the practices that characterise a tax system, how wide-
spread they are and how they can pose threats to tax bases,
both within the jurisdiction under consideration and else-
where. The framework appraises such questions on a sys-
tematic basis, by collecting impressions and accounts of the
processes at work, in ways that can be replicated across
countries.
Example pilot appraisals
We now present pilot evaluations for the United Kingdom
and Denmark. The literature expects tax competition and
downward pressures on rates to be highest in liberal market
economies with higher degrees of openness to international
capital mobility, and lower in co-ordinated market econo-
mies (Swank, 2016). The UK is a relatively large open liberal
market economy where there has been political support for
lower corporate taxes and has recently pursued what might
be construed as aggressive international tax competition.
For contrast, we compare the UK with Denmark, as a Scandi-
navian social democracy, where support for higher taxes
and redistribution has traditionally been higher.
In both cases, we have used the questionnaire to guide
our allocation of scores. We have used our knowledge of
these tax systems to inform judgements, but have also con-
sulted widely with other tax experts and stake holders from
government, think tanks, NGOs, law and accountancy pro-
fessions with direct experience of these tax systems in for-
mulating our assessments. We recommend IO staff
conducting such evaluations also engage in similar pro-
cesses of stakeholder consultation collecting impressions,
that could be reported in qualitative diagnostic commentary
and in informing judgements reached as in the case of the
corporate governance ROSC process. That particular instance
involved a close collaboration between the OECD and the
World Bank, with a World Bank team conducting the actual
assessment. A similar division of labour, with IMF staff also
involved in the design of the assessment exercise and with
access to ﬁndings would be desirable here. In undertaking
these pilot evaluations, we have simulated the kind of stake-
holder dialogue IO staff would need to undertake in the
assessment process. Our cross-referencing with other stake-
holders could be more exhaustive, subjected to further pro-
cesses of triangulation, including greater use of survey and
interview data, to reﬁne scores. We emphasise the scores
and grids we present here are very much pilots and indica-
tive rather than deﬁnitive. They are intended to show how
the framework works as an evaluation toolkit and what it
can generate in terms of scores, visualisations, including spil-
lover risk/vulnerability dashboards, and how this could
inform future policy dialogue (Figure 2, 3).
Extensive red blocks in the columns on the second half of
the UK grid, show that administrative laxity in the UK, gen-
erate spillovers that undermine other areas of the UK tax
system to a considerable degree. In the Danish grid, we see
no red with a majority of yellow squares, indicating only
moderate domestic spillovers. Notably, in the UK case there
are no green or dark yellow squares, indicating that no
aspect of the UK tax system acts to reinforce, or support
other areas. Indeed, the picture is of most areas being in
competition with other areas. In the Danish case we ﬁnd
only moderate threat levels for the income tax base emerg-
ing from more recent efforts to reduce corporation tax and
some reforms to company and trust administration, but no
area of the tax system undermines other areas to a consid-
erable extent. The aggregate Danish score of 194, 75 lower
than the UK score of 269, suggests a more balanced Danish
regime, with tax politics and policies having a lower impact
in undermining the Danish tax base. The overall average UK
threat level of 269/64, or 4.203, shows that current practices
undermine the overall tax base to some extent (at 4.5 the
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Figure 2. UK Grid 1 Domestic Spillovers.
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Figure 3. Denmark Grid 1 Domestic Spillovers.
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UK would tip over into red). This contrasts with an average
overall threat level of 3 in Denmark, indicating a more
benign environment, albeit one that is becoming less so.
Fully appreciating how the scores are arrived at and their
justiﬁcations, requires reading the much longer accompany-
ing qualitative reports that explain how the questionnaire
has been answered and documents practices uncovered
during the course of the assessment. The main pattern in
the UK case is that tax politics, tax administration, company
and trust administration have combined to undermine other
elements of the tax system. Three areas emerged as doing
particular harm to the income tax base: (1) UK domicile
rules that favour non-domiciles over residents, allowing
them to claim all income arises outside of the UK; (2) limited
‘close company’ provisions allowing income to be shifted
into corporation tax at lower rates; (3) the weak administra-
tion of capital gains with minimal reporting requirements
allowing income to be disguised as capital gains. Corpora-
tion and social security tax bases were both notably under-
mined by: (1) weak company and trust administration
resulting in 400,000 companies annually failing to ﬁle
reports on their management and beneﬁcial ownership; (2)
the Registrar of Companies not requiring automatic disclo-
sure of ownership at point of registration, unless an agent is
engaged for registration purposes; and (3) relative ease of
incorporation, facilitating false company creation to avoid
social security payments. The under-resourced and under
staffed nature of the UK tax authority may also impede
active pursuit of investigations and monitoring across a
whole range of areas, while UK implementation of AIE to
date has been uneven creating a number of blind spots that
potentially undermine UK revenue collection capacity
(Figure 2).
The headline number of 232 for international risk gen-
erated in the UK case, against 92 in the Danish case, cap-
tures the more aggressive pursuit of tax competition in
the UK, particularly through recent reductions in corpora-
tion tax to the lowest level in the G20 and a political dis-
course that lauds tax competition and low corporation tax
(Figure 4 and 5). To provide some context we should also
note that we have also completed an international risk
grid for the Cayman Islands – a well-known tax haven,
which produced a score of 304. The 232 score for the UK
therefore represents a middle/upper level of aggression
towards other states (Figure 4).
The more aggressive imprint of the UK regime on the rest
of the world is revealed in the footprint diagram, with the
Danish footprint revealing a more contained and com-
pressed shape, in which moderate aggressive competitive
intent is largely conﬁned to creeping laxity in company and
trust administration, shown in the pale blue line (Figure 6).
The UK footprint shows greater and more invasive and
aggressive outreach across numerous areas. Denmark
emerges from the exercise as a relatively good performer, as
indicated in the high number of green risk scores that poses
no threats to other states (Figure 5).
Figure 4. UK Grid 2 international spillover risks generated.
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Figure 5. Denmark Grid 2 international spillover risks generated.
Tax spillovers Income tax
Corporaon 
tax
Capital gain 
tax
Social 
security Tax polics
Tax 
administraon
Company and 
trust 
administraon
Internaonal 
agreements Total
Sub 
totals
Income tax 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
Corporaon tax 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 12
Capital gain tax 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
Social security 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
Tax polics 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 11
Tax 
administraon 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
Company and 
trust 
administraon 4 4 3 1 1 3 4 1 21
Internaonal 
agreements 3 3 2 1 3 2 1 1 16
Total 13 17 11 8 13 11 11 8 92 92
Denmark 
internaonal 
tax spillovers: 
risk to other 
countries from 
the UK
The issue in other countries
Issue being  
assessed for 
Denmark
36
56
Figure 6. UK and Denmark international spillover risk footprints compared.
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The dangers of lax company and trust administration in
the UK is again a feature of the international risk spillover
grid, with a score of 39 (maximum = 40). Moreover, this
potentially undermines less mobile aspects of other coun-
tries’ tax base – income tax and social security – that the
IMF worry maybe the most harmful forms of spillover. Partic-
ular threats arise from: (1) the ease of creating a company
in the UK and of allocating income earned elsewhere to it;
(2) an absence of beneﬁcial ownership checks by the UK
Registrar of Companies, and limited beneﬁcial ownership
disclosure arrangements, creating barriers to identifying the
true owners of companies; (3) the failure to enforce laws on
document ﬁling, (400,000 companies on average fail to meet
their requirements; and (4) the UK tax authority failing to
collect any tax returns from companies claiming to trade
solely outside of the UK. The latter is a UK administrative
blind spot that creates potential information shortfalls for
tax authorities in other countries, as it allows micro entities
to incorporate in the UK, without having to provide any
information, which could be exchanged with authorities in
the trading location and that would allow them to collect
revenue. It is precisely these kinds of practices that poten-
tially undermine the tax bases of other countries, in ways
that econometric techniques struggle to capture, which our
framework is designed to pick up and identify as areas for
potential reform (Figure 4).
The third and ﬁnal grid shows that the UK suffers a sur-
prising degree of vulnerability to international spillovers
(Figure 7). Income tax and tax administration have the high-
est degree of vulnerability, with all areas vulnerable to some
extent. The vulnerability of UK income tax is mainly due to
the difﬁculties UK tax authorities face in accessing informa-
tion on income earned by individuals via companies regis-
tered outside of the UK, with AIE’s capacity to tackle this
remaining unproven. At the same time, zero or negligible
rates of corporation tax elsewhere create incentives for com-
panies and individuals to move income outside of the UK.
Conclusions
Three steps have been taken in this paper. First, with many
established measurement systems and numerical indicators
struggling to capture complex global economic phe-
nomenon, we have suggested that qualitative forms of eval-
uation can help to provide a better reading of complex
global economic issues. Using insights from the literature on
international benchmarking, we have highlighted how the
approaches used to evaluate national policies, often have
underlying normative assumptions and effectively engage in
a form of ‘norm evaluation’. Consequently, the most impor-
tant question facing a future form of spillover analysis, is
the purpose it should serve, or its overarching objective
Figure 7. UK Grid 3 vulnerability to international spillovers.
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based on a ‘systemic vision’ of a good or better interna-
tional tax system and its prospective constituent norms
Baker (2018). Accepting this we have created a tax spillover
framework that is minimally normative, proceeding from the
assumption that identifying and discouraging policies and
procedures that can cause harm to other states as part of
an effective international moral harm convention is desir-
able. While at ﬁrst glance this appears to be a challenge to
the existing order, it is also a response to the demands from
established large scale NGOs and the staff of IOs, for a work-
able form of country level spillover analysis. We work with
the grain and ﬁndings of established actors (IMF, NGOs), but
also move beyond them in suggesting new methodological
departures by creating a framework that combines reformist
and revolutionary logics and practices. Central to the frame-
work is the attachment of reputational risk to forms of tax
competition that harm other direct taxes and other coun-
tries’ tax bases, through the grading and reporting of such
risks.
In the second step we highlighted some of the method-
ological difﬁculties of quantifying spillovers applying econo-
metric techniques and established data sets at a country
level. We also re-deﬁned spillover, to cover a more compre-
hensive range of spillover effects, including within country
spillovers between different parts of national tax systems.
Most importantly of all our approach to evaluating spillovers
is driven by an understanding of the purpose and intent of
corporate taxes as primarily defensive – to reinforce or pre-
vent the erosion of other parts of the tax base such as
income tax. Drawing on the experience that established IOs
such as the World Bank have with qualitative methods of
assessment and evaluation we suggest a similar process, or
framework could work well in the case of tax spillover.
In a ﬁnal step, we outlined how our framework works as
a spillover assessment toolkit and presented some initial
pilot simulation evaluations. Observers of international tax
affairs may be unsurprised by the scores and the contents
of the ﬁndings, but our purpose has not been to uncover a
new story about the tax practices of particular states, or
their consequences. These very preliminary pilot assess-
ments have been generated to show how the framework
can generate systematic appraisals of spillover risk and
inform policy dialogue about targeted future reforms, con-
tributing to more secure tax bases, by providing initial read-
ings of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities particular
countries face. The visualisations and scores can also be
used to attach a reputational risk to aggressive tax competi-
tion that potentially harms other states. In the UK case, its
relatively poor performance in all three grids could help to
catalyse a ‘politics of bad performance’. The evaluation iden-
tiﬁed company and trust administration as a particular area,
in need of attention that could bring potential domestic
and international beneﬁts. Extensive notes justifying the
awarded scores also produce a structured in depth report
that qualitatively assesses the practices of particular tax sys-
tems. In this sense, the framework could be deployed by
teams of evaluators from an IO engaging in a country-by-
country spillover assessment exercise, or by NGOs who wish
to move the tax spillover agenda along by demonstrating
how spillover analyses can be undertaken.
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1. This could supplement more quantitative efforts at spillover assess-
ment, rather than replace them in their entirety.
2. In the UK, the All Party Parliamentary Group on responsible tax called
for HM Treasury to provide an assessment on international spillovers
from UK tax policy (APPG, 2016)
3. Of course the biggest obstacle such efforts face is a Trump White-
house determined to cut the United States own headline corporation
tax rates, but this is a position that is increasingly out of step with
expert and wider public sentiment (Beer et al., 2018).
4. Stopping a race to the bottom is not explicitly supported by the
mainly UK politicians we have engaged with on the matter, but nor
is it explicitly rejected.
5. Headline ﬁgures are often not a good guide to the amounts of tax
being paid on corporate proﬁts in particular jurisdictions due to
assorted tax breaks, holidays and loopholes, making actual rates paid
much lower. It is however symbolic of the broader trend and direc-
tion of travel.
6. The benchmark IMF paper (IMF, 2014), reveals both IMF and Euro-
pean Commission (2012) support for identifying and reducing harm-
ful tax competition. Private conversations with OECD and World Bank
ofﬁcials also reveals support for this. We developed this proposal fol-
lowing an approach from Oxfam and conversations with Action Aid,
Christian Aid, Eurodad and the Tax Justice Network (Baker and Mur-
phy, 2017).
7. The research focused on just 13 countries in only two years, just 4%
of Irish overseas investment 2009–2013. Notably, the publication of
revenue from royalties and license fees into Ireland from all African,
Asian and South American countries bar ﬁve, is prohibited, restricting
assessments of the tax treatment of this income (Christian Aid,
2017a).
8 Two further rationales for corporation tax are compensation for the
beneﬁts accruing to companies from their incorporation by the state as
limited liability companies and for limiting the ﬁnancial resources at
the disposal of corporate management as a regulatory device enhanc-
ing accountability through increased information on corporate transac-
tions. The second of these is favoured by Avi- Yonah (2004) and we see
this as complementary to our defensive conception.
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